This article summarizes the 2016 update of the DISCONTOOLS project gap analysis on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which was based on a combination of literature review and expert knowledge. Uncertainty still exists in relation to the pathogenesis, immunology and epidemiology of BSE, but provided that infected material is prohibited from entering the animal feed chain, cases should continue to decline. BSE does not appear to spread between cattle, but if new strains with this ability appear then control would be considerably more difficult. Atypical types of BSE (L-BSE and H-BSE) have been identified, which have different molecular patterns and pathology, and do not display the same clinical signs as classical BSE. Laboratory transmission experiments indicate that the L-BSE agent has zoonotic potential. There is no satisfactory conclusion regarding the origin of the BSE epidemic. C-BSE case numbers declined rapidly following strict controls banning ruminant protein in animal feed, but occasional cases still occur. It is unclear whether these more recent cases indicate inadequate implementation of the bans, or the possibility that C-BSE might occur spontaneously, as has been postulated for H-and L-BSE. All of this will have implications once existing bans and levels of surveillance are both relaxed. Immunochemical
and felines (Hilbe, Soldati, Zlinszky, Wunderlin, & Ehrensperger, 2009; Wyatt, Pearson, Smerdon, Gruffydd-Jones, & Wells, 1990) have also been naturally infected. BSE is the only animal TSE that has been shown to be zoonotic.
The infectious agent is an abnormal, self-replicating, proteaseresistant protein isoform (PrP Sc where "Sc" is from the word "scrapie")
of a normal host-encoded protein (PrP c where "c" is from "cellular"). It is hypothesized that different tertiary protein conformations of PrP Sc give rise to different "strains" of agent, with different host species tropisms and disease phenotypes (Prusiner, 1994) . PrP Sc is involved in the pathogenesis of the disease and is considered to be the main or only component of the infectious agent. However, infectivity can be identified in the absence of detectable PrP Sc (Lasmezas et al., 1997) , which may simply represent a test sensitivity issue, although it has been speculated that disease-specific but non protease-resistant forms of PrP may also exist (Sajnani et al., 2012 ).
An alternative, less accepted, theory is that the agent is virus-like and possesses nucleic acids although these have never been demonstrated (Manuelidis, Sklaviadis, Akowitz, & Fritch, 1995) .
Similarly, an essential involvement of cofactors (e.g., protein, mRNA)
has been mooted, but has not been adequately identified or proven (Telling et al., 1995) .
The first cases of BSE were recognized in the UK in 1986 as a neurological disease of adult cattle (Wells et al., 1987) , which was identified as an extended common source epidemic linked to the presence of infected meat and bone meal (MBM) in animal feed (Wilesmith, Wells, Cranwell, & Ryan, 1988) . In the UK, banning mam- (OIE, 2016b) . Where the disease has occurred in other countries, it tends to have the same phenotype as the disease in the UK cattle population, and in many cases has been linked to the UK, either by movement of cattle or cattle feedstuffs. Studies of disease phenotype suggest that a single strain of BSE agent was present during the epidemic (Casalone, Caramelli, Crescio, Spencer, & Simmons, 2006; Debeer, Baron, & Bencsik, 2003; Fatzer et al., 1996; Simmons et al., 1996; Wells & McGill, 1992) .
Currently, the occurrence of the disease worldwide is really low.
Where sufficient surveillance data are available, the epidemiological pattern is a general and constant decline in the frequency of BSE in the field. Strict controls are imposed as recommended in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health code (OIE, 2016a). These controls are based on the assessment of the risk of entry and exposure to the BSE agent, which leads to the recognition of a BSE risk status of countries and facilitates trade of live cattle and commodities.
Variants of BSE, classified as H-or L-BSE depending on the molecular characteristics of the disease-associated prion protein (PrP   sc   ) in Western blot, have also been described in a number of countries, predominantly in older animals (Biacabe, Laplanche, Ryder, & Baron, 2004; Casalone et al., 2004; EFSA, 2014) . Given the rarity of these "atypical" cases, their occurrence in aged animals and their widespread geographical distribution (including five countries i.e., Brazil, Norway, Romania, Sweden and the United States with no history of classical BSE [C-BSE]), it is speculated that these cases may occur spontaneously and without a causal link to the feedborne C-BSE epidemic (Boujon, Serra, & Seuberlich, 2016) . Atypical forms of disease appear to be related to agent strains that are different from each other and different from C-BSE (Baron, Biacabe, Bencsik, & Langeveld, 2006; Buschmann et al., 2006; Okada et al., 2011) , although in some experimental settings both H-BSE and L-BSE have "mutated" into strains with characteristics consistent with C-BSE (Beringue et al., 2007; Capobianco et al., 2007; Torres et al., 2011) .
However, the link, if any, between atypical and classical forms of BSE is still not known. It has yet to be established unequivocally if these represent distinct pathogens, or are biological variants of the classical BSE pathogen (or vice versa). The zoonotic potential of these atypical forms is not known, but is strongly indicated by experimental data for L-BSE (Beringue et al., 2008; Comoy et al., 2008; Kong et al., 2008; Mestre-Frances et al., 2012; Ono et al., 2011 ).
The precise pathogenesis of any of these recognized forms of BSE is still unclear. No agent is detectable in the infected animal for much of the incubation period, but it has not been established how much of this is due to test sensitivity limitations . Based on limited experimental bioassay data, infectivity is known to be demonstrable in some tissues prior to the accumulation of detectable PrP Sc (Wells, Spiropoulos, Hawkins, & Ryder, 2005; Wells et al., 1994 in a cohort will be exposed to the same feed. It is assumed that the non-affected animals are not infected because there is no evidence of disease or of the disease marker PrP Sc . However, no effective means exists to screen a population for evidence of whether low-level infectivity may be present in such animals, which were definitely exposed.
Recently, some C-BSE cases in 5-to 8-year-old cattle born several years after the implementation of the feed ban have been detected through active surveillance in both Canada and Europe (Anonymous, 2015a , 2015b , 2015c , EFSA, 2016 . In March 2016, one case, born in 2011, was reported in France (Anonymous, 2016) .
This situation may suggest that C-BSE could also be a rare sporadic disease such as the H-and L-BSE forms. However, all those cases, unlike atypical forms, have only occurred in countries that experienced C-BSE epidemics and where residual sources of exposure may still exist, and this still fits with the hypothetical "epidemic tail" predicted by mathematical models (Adkin, Simons, & Arnold, 2016) . 
| BSE IN THE NATURAL H OST
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy primarily affects adult cattle. Disease in household cats (FSE) and in ruminant and feline species in zoos has been demonstrated to be caused by the C-BSE agent (Baron et al., 1997; Peet & Curran, 1992; Wyatt et al., 1991) . There have been two cases of BSE confirmed in goats in commercial herds, one in France and one in the UK (Eloit et al., 2005; Spiropoulos et al., 2011) . There is no evidence from retrospective studies that BSE has become established in the commercial sheep population (Stack et al., 2006) , but experimental data confirm that sheep are susceptible orally and can transmit the disease under normal husbandry conditions (Bellworthy et al., 2005) . Sheep and goats were exposed to the same MBM feed components as cattle during the epidemic. Work in transgenic mouse models has indicated that BSE, once passaged through a sheep, has a wider host range and an increased "virulence" (Plinston et al., 2011) . BSE is the only known animal TSE that has been demonstrated to be zoonotic, resulting in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in man (EFSA, 2011).
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy has an impact on the welfare of the affected animal. The commonest clinical signs are apprehension, hypersensitivity to touch and sound, and ataxia. A range of signs can be seen related to changes in the mental state, sensation and alterations in posture and movement. General signs include weight loss and reduced milk yield (Braun, Schicker, & Hornlimann, 1998; Konold et al., 2004) . In general, morbidity is low, with the majority of cases arising as single cases on a farm despite all the animals on that farm being exposed to the same batches of feedstuffs.
However, in the UK, some clustering of cases within the same herd was demonstrated (Donnelly, Ferguson, Ghani, et al., 1997; Ferguson, Ghani, Donnelly, Denny, & Anderson, 1998) . Signs may be different for the atypical forms of disease, at least at some stages of the disease. In these cases, dullness, difficulty in rising and ataxia feature most consistently (Konold et al., 2012 The median incubation period for animals naturally infected with C-BSE is 4-5 years although a small proportion of cases early in the epidemic developed disease at <30 months. Incubation period (in experimental animals) is broadly related to infective dose . The pre-clinical period for the atypical forms is unknown, but they are detected predominantly in older animals under natural conditions. Most atypical field cases are older than 8 years of age, and some considerably more than this (Biacabe, Morignat, Vulin, Calavas, & Baron, 2008; EFSA, 2014 , 2016 , Guldimann, Gsponer, Drogemuller, Oevermann, & Seuberlich, 2012 . It is speculated that these diseases are spontaneous neurodegenerative diseases on this basis, as well as on the basis of epidemiological trends. However, in experimental inoculation models in cattle, the incubation periods of H-and L-BSE were similar to or shorter than those observed with C-BSE (Balkema- Buschmann, Ziegler, et al., 2011; Fukuda et al., 2009; Konold et al., 2012; Lombardi et al., 2008) . All field-based incubation period calculations make the assumption that animals are effectively exposed within the first year of life (Anderson et al., 1996; Arnold & Wilesmith, 2004) . Cattle challenge studies investigating this age relationship are presently being completed. There is some experimental evidence in sheep that age at exposure affects incubation period, with older animals becoming relatively less susceptible (St Rose et al., 2007) , but this has never been unequivocally established for cattle. there is limited detectable involvement of peripheral nerves, the adrenal gland and gut-associated lymphoid tissues in cattle (Buschmann & Groschup, 2005; Hoffmann et al., 2011; Kaatz et al., 2012; Wells et al., 1999,) . Infectivity and PrP Sc have been detected in tissues such as tonsil and Peyer's patches of the ileum in cattle, so low-level shedding in faeces cannot be ruled out. It is not known whether the failure to detect shed infectivity/PrP Sc is a consequence of disease pathogenesis or test sensitivity. It is possible that there is some shedding from infected cattle that is below the threshold of detection of the methods available to look for it, but there is no epidemiological evidence that this is a significant route of infection.
Consistent detection of infectivity and PrP
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy results in spongiform changes (vacuolation) in specific neuroanatomical areas throughout the brain which are visible on histological examination. Protein fibrils, also known as scrapie-associated fibrils, are a consistent diagnostic findings in all TSEs and can be seen by electron microscopy (Bolton, McKinley, & Prusiner, 1982; Hope et al.,1988; Scott, Wells, Stack, White, & Dawson, 1990) . The misfolded protease-resistant protein PrP Sc is a very consistent component in the pathogenesis of the disease and accumulates mainly in the central nervous system and variably in the lymphoreticular system (Balkema- Buschmann, Fast, et al., 2011; EFSA, 2014; Wells et al., 1994 Wells et al., , 2005 . However it is not known which-if any-of these abnormalities directly results in clinical disease or death. There is a very poor understanding, not least because of the lack of a good experimental model, of the precise pathogenesis of disease at either the cellular or the whole animal
level, or what mechanisms underpin strain-specific phenotypic differences or zoonotic potential. Until it can be established whether infection is acquired through ingestion, or another route, or whether atypical cases are all spontaneous neurodegenerative diseases, it is not possible to know which experimental route offers the best model for studying pathogenesis.
Currently, data on the anatomical distribution of PrP Sc in atypical cases are confined to end-stage disease, predominantly in intracerebrally challenged animals and comprises mainly the brain and spinal cord, but also to a limited extent peripheral nerves, adrenal gland and muscle (EFSA, 2014) . The limited availability of infected brain material prevents larger pathogenesis studies or a fulsome exploration of susceptibility by other routes. Similarly, the possibility cannot be excluded that, as is the case for human TSE, a small proportion of cases are genetic in origin (Richt & Hall, 2008) although studies performed, to date, have failed to identify a robust genetic candidate.
| EPID EMIOLOGY
The BSE epidemic was linked to an extended common source which was the result of the inclusion of ruminant derived protein (MBM) in cattle rations (Wilesmith et al., 1988) . Despite the fact that some clustering within herds has been observed, there is no understanding of why only single animals out of groups fed the same feed succumbed to disease. Some genetic factors have been explored, but there is no clear link to susceptibility to date. It has been speculated that age at exposure (Arnold & Wilesmith, 2004) Ru, Maurella, Maroni Ponti, Ingravalle, & Caramelli, 2007; Wilesmith et al., 1988 Wilesmith et al., , 2000 .
The possible heterogeneous distribution of infectivity in feed could also play a role. However, through simulation models, it has been shown that the case clustering within herds may be consistent with both an over-dispersed distribution of feed usage and betweenproducer variability in the extent to which the infectivity in feed was reduced during feed production. However, the clustering patterns were not compatible with an exposure heterogeneity due to infectivity aggregation in feed (Hagenaars, Ferguson, Donnelly, Ghani, & Anderson, 2000) .
The legitimate use of MBM or other protein in the feed of other species (e.g., pigs, poultry) facilitated accidental cross-contamination of feed intended for ruminants (Stevenson et al., 2005; Wilesmith, 1996) . Once MBM was effectively eliminated from the rations, the source of the infection was removed. However, the initial source of contamination was never identified. H-and L-BSE are hypothesized by some to be rare spontaneous or sporadic diseases (for overviews see EFSA, 2014 , Boujon et al., 2016 although many of the cases identified so far were born before the implementation of fully effective feed bans in the respective countries.
Cases of all three types of BSE have been born after the most rigorous feed bans, but the numbers of animals are too small to make any robust epidemiological assessment of this. It is unclear whether these can still be attributed to poor implementation/policing of the feed bans, or whether this now supports the notion that-like the more recently identified atypical forms of disease-C-BSE was originally a rare (possibly spontaneous) disease of cattle, in which case occasional cases will continue to occur. If some categories of cases are sporadic, it is anticipated that such cases are present worldwide.
Where the disease has occurred in other countries, it tends to have the same phenotype as the disease in the UK cattle population and can often be linked to the UK (either by movement of cattle or cattle feedstuffs). Several multidisciplinary studies suggest that only a single strain of agent, C-BSE, was present during the epidemic. The epidemic declined once the feed controls were strictly enforced and the specified risk materials (SRM) banned (Ducrot, Arnold, de Koeijer, Heim, & Calavas, 2008; Ducrot et al., 2010; EFSA, 2016) .
There is no evidence of animal to animal spread, but a cohort study indicated that a very low level of maternal transmission may have occurred during the epidemic in the UK (Wilesmith, Wells, Ryan, Gavier-Widen, & Simmons, 1997) , which is also consistent with some of the statistical models applied to the C-BSE epidemic (Donnelly, Ferguson, Wilesmith, & Anderson, 1997; Ferguson, Donnelly, Woolhouse, & Anderson, 1997) ; it is also possible that this was in part due to a confounder effect as both the dam and the offspring were infected via feed (Hoinville, Wilesmith, & Richards, 1995; Wilesmith et al., 1997) . Experimental sheep to sheep transmission of BSE has been demonstrated under normal commercial husbandry conditions (Bellworthy et al., 2005) , but modelling suggests that this would not be self-sustaining (Ferguson et al., 1997) .
Cases have occurred mainly throughout most of Europe, but also in the Americas and Asia. Widely differing levels of surveillance are in place in different countries, so direct comparison is very difficult.
Due to the low prevalence of the disease, surveillance systems may be unable to detect the disease if the number of tested animals is not very large. To demonstrate a negligible BSE risk in a country, the OIE requires the implementation of a surveillance system able to detect BSE at a design prevalence of at least one case per 100,000
in the adult bovine population, at a confidence level of 95% (OIE, 2016a) . Moreover surveillance targeting may play an important role as the probability of detection is affected by the age at testing and by the sourcing category, that is, if animals come from healthy slaughter or from fallen stock (EFSA, 2016).
If cases of C-BSE are spontaneous in origin, then there is every likelihood that they could arise in any cattle population, and they would only be detected in a population with a comprehensive active TSE surveillance programme.
The results from some experimental transmissions indicate that there may be an aetiological relationship between atypical and classical BSE (Beringue et al., 2007; Capobianco et al., 2007) , but further studies would be necessary to consolidate this.
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy does not appear to spread between cattle and has no known vector (Ducrot et al., 2008) . There is some seasonality to disease occurrence (Hoinville, 1994) Both L-BSE and H-BSE agents are also able to propagate in other species following experimental challenge. There is a wider host susceptibility for L-BSE, with transmissions demonstrated in mice (Capobianco et al., 2007) , sheep (Simmons et al., 2016) , voles (Espinosa et al., 2016) , primates (Comoy et al., 2008) and hamsters (Shu et al., 2011) , as well as in transgenic mice expressing heterologous, that is non-bovine, PrP sequences (Beringue et al., 2008; Kong et al., 2008) . Transmission of H-BSE isolates to bovine PrP transgenic mice has been reported (Buschmann et al., 2006) . It has also been sug- (median age at onset 26 years) with a longer duration of illness (median 14 months) and is linked to exposure to BSE probably through food (Bruce et al., 1997; Will et al., 1996) . The latent period from exposure to tissue infectivity in humans is not known.
Iatrogenic spread in humans has occurred through blood transfusion only for variant CJD linked to the BSE agent (Llewelyn et al., 2004) . Iatrogenic spread of other, exclusively human, forms of CJD has occurred through growth hormone preparations, and corneal or dura mater grafts (Rappaport, 1987) . In all countries, surveillance in man is passive rather than active which may lead to significant underestimation of prion-related disorders as was seen in cattle and sheep when active surveillance programmes were introduced.
The annual incidence of vCJD is extremely low: currently, the total number of cases worldwide is 229. As at December 2016, the majority of the vCJD cases had occurred in the UK (178) This disease has a very high impact on individuals who contract it. However, the limited number of cases means that the overall impact in a country has always been low. It still remains to be assessed whether a link between atypical forms of BSE and some sporadic CJD cases may exist.
| Socio-economic impact
The individual economic impact of BSE cases is considered to be limited, as most farms only had one case. The disease is not treatable, and affected animals are culled, and compensation paid.
However, this does not cover wider consequential financial losses (e.g., Probst, Gethmann, Heuser, Niemann, & Conraths, 2013) .
The control measures implemented and enforced internationally for BSE were expensive, and included:
• investigation, slaughter and compensation, disposal of carcasses.
• culls of offspring, cohorts.
• active surveillance of cattle for slaughter, with over 10 million cattle tested each year in the EU (EFSA, 2016).
• disposal of cattle over 30 months in the UK for a period of more than 10 years
• collection and disposal of SRM from abattoirs • trade bans These controls had a variable impact depending on the status of the country and the loss of export markets for animals and their products. While there was little impact on food security or on livestock production, there was a major impact on public confidence in food production.
There was also a major impact on international trade/exports from countries with a BSE history (e.g., in Canada (Poulin & Boame, 2003) ) in relation to live cattle, meat and other products which were banned if they originated from countries with a high incidence of BSE, as it was not possible to provide BSE clearance to herds or individual animals. Bans were also imposed on milk, semen and embryos although there was no evidence that they posed a risk.
There was also a major impact on EU intracommunity trade, with bans on imports from countries considered to have a high incidence of BSE and which were thought to pose a risk in cattle.
Overall the impact on national trade was minimal. If it is shown that BSE cases-including C-BSE-are indeed sporadic, then the trade limitations currently imposed for countries with a history of BSE cases would also have to apply to other countries where SRM measures are not in place if animal protein is not actively excluded from animal feed in those countries.
| IMMUN E RE SPONSE TO INFECTION
The disease does not elicit a conventional humoral immune response in an affected animal, so serology cannot be used as an in vivo marker of infection or disease. The accumulation of PrP Sc in the brain, which is the earliest consistent and detectable disease-specific change in cattle, also occurs without eliciting a classical host immune response, although there is activation of the glial cells in the CNS.
Antibodies can be raised against PrP C and also specifically against PrP Sc in antibody production models, but there is no measurable humoral response in an affected individual, presumably because the majority of the abnormal protein is host generated and induces immunotolerance.
| MAIN MEANS OF PRE VENTION, DETECTION AND CONTROL
Currently, in the EU and many other countries, it is required to notify suspicion of disease, to slaughter and dispose of clinical cases and to identify and slaughter birth cohorts born within 1 year of the positive case, which may have been fed the same ration. This also applies to recent offspring of BSE-confirmed cattle, with the possibility of applying for a derogation to allow these offspring to live to the end of their productive lives (OIE, 2016a). These controls are facilitated by the regulatory requirement to identify all cattle individually with a passport system, linked to movement controls and good record keeping to ensure animal traceability. Indirectly, it has also resulted in the slaughter or culling of large numbers of small ruminants in the context of scrapie control measures which have been brought in because of the hypothetical risk of BSE in sheep and the identification of two naturally occurring BSE cases in commercial goats.
A key public health measure is the requirement for abattoirs to remove and dispose of specified risk material: that is tonsils and intestines from cattle of all ages, and the brains, eyes, spinal cord, skull and vertebral column from animals over 12 months of age (Ducrot et al., 2008; Anonymous, 2001) . However, there is very limited data on the distribution of PrP and/or infectivity in H-and L-BSE-affected animals (EFSA, 2014). The data that do exist are confined to end-stage disease (i.e., no data on pathogenesis) and are largely derived from animals that have been experimentally inoculated intracerebrally. This could become an issue if SRM regulations are relaxed, when there is still no real understanding of the potential human health risks from dietary exposure to atypical prion strains.
The principal animal health protection measures relate to the ban on the recycling of mammalian MBM. These controls are strictly regulated and enforced. Current routine surveillance methods are in use to detect bone fragments and muscle fibres in animal feed (Hahn, 1999) . There are both serological (Ansfield, 1994) and PCR-based methods (Tartaglia et al., 1998; Wang et al., 2000) to distinguish the species of origin of any feed contaminants, and regulations stipulating feed screening requirements. Comprehensive and appropriate detection systems for banned protein in feed, for example, methods which would also detect soft tissue and fluids are being further developed (Lecrenier et al., 2016; van Raamsdonk, Margry, van Kaathoven, & Bremer, 2015) .
The BSE agent is extremely stable and resistant to freezing, heating, drying and cooking at normal temperatures, particularly if adhering to a surface. Pasteurization and sterilization will not destroy the agent, nor does chemical fixation for histology. Infectious titre can be reduced by some/all of these methods, but they are not absolute (Taylor, 1993 (Taylor, , 2000 . However, as for all proteins, prions when sufficiently accessible to water can be destroyed by using warm alkaline conditions which hydrolyse the peptide bonds. There is no clear understanding of how any of these methods might affect the biological properties of any agent subjected to them. Due to the very low prevalence of disease and the difficulties in assessing environmental contamination, there are no decontamination procedures currently applied within commercial farm settings or abattoirs. However, environmental persistence of BSE has been demonstrated under experimental conditions (Xu et al., 2014) , but the limited peripheral tissue distribution of BSE in cattle probably reduces the likelihood of substantial shedding into the environment. Epidemiology certainly supports the assumption that the disease does not transmit readily if at all through direct animal to animal contact or via the environment.
In practice, there is still no fully effective/practical decontamination method. On farm burial has been banned in Europe in most areas for more than 10 years. However, there has been a recent derogation for outlying areas. There are very few test methods available for the detection of environmental contamination or the confirmation of effective decontamination, and although their specificity is good, it is not possible to assess their sensitivity (Konold et al., 2015) .
Clear consistent methods of decontaminating laboratories and laboratory waste, that are accepted internationally, are required. BSE is a containment category 3 pathogen for humans (with derogations because it is not air-borne), and appropriate precautions should be taken when handling BSE-infected material (Leunda, van Vaerenbergh, Baldo, Roels, & Herman, 2013) . There is no evidence that the live animal presents any specific risk to human health (apart from risk of injury from unpredictable behaviour). While there is no evidence from epidemiological studies that there is any proven occupation link between BSE and related human disease, recent evidence that other forms of TSE (CWD and scrapie) can transmit effectively through aerosol exposure (which is distinct from the pathogen being truly airborne) would nonetheless support the continuing use of precautionary principles when reviewing containment levels for this pathogen (Haybaeck et al., 2011) .
Most cases of vCJD are believed to be of dietary origin, following the ingestion of food containing the infective agent, particularly before the implementation of the rules requiring the removal of specified bovine risk materials from the food and feed chains. Provided infected material is prevented from entering the animal feed and human food chains, BSE and vCJD case numbers should continue to decline. However, the initial source of contamination was never identified. The sterilization of instruments used in dentistry and surgery is critical to prevent the iatrogenic spread of infection, but this is not always fully effective, and wherever possible, disposable instrumentation is recommended. TSEs (Doherr et al., 2001 (Doherr et al., , 2002 . Currently, fallen stock is targeted as the most likely to be affected although previously there was widespread testing of healthy slaughter populations throughout the EU.
All surveillance requires the removal of the obex section of the medulla from the brains of adult cattle either at slaughter, post-mortem or point of disposal (Wells et al., 1989 ). The obex is tested using one of the validated tests, as defined in the EU regulations and the OIE Manual (OIE, 2008) . Commercial kits are available to screen for and confirm disease on examination of fresh (i.e., unfixed) brain tissue. (Wilham et al., 2010) and amyloid seeding assay (Colby et al., 2007) . Such methods are often (but not always) more sensitive than the bioassay, and it must be remembered that while PrP Sc is a consistent disease marker, and the only practical target identified for such rapid tests, there is not necessarily a consistent association between the amount of detectable PrP Sc and the amount of infectivity in a sample (Gonz alez et al., 2012) . However, the problem of false positives is difficult to tackle due to the "self nature" of the agent, and the relevance of the presence of PrP Sc in an otherwise healthy person is not yet clear (Gill et al., 2013) . The development of such tests for widespread screening applications may be unrealistic considering the unusually high specificity demanded of TSE tests although Rt-QuIC has been successfully piloted for surveillance applications in humans (Zanusso et al., 2016 The development of vaccines so far poses an insurmountable challenge even though some attempts have been carried out (Goñi et al., 2015) . In the event of vaccines being required, the time from development to approval would be lengthy as the pathogenesis is not fully understood, and there is currently no evidence of an immune response. Very expensive and detailed research would be needed to unravel the pathogenesis and to identify whether a vaccine is feasible. higher than that of the C-BSE agent. There is insufficient epidemiological data with which to undertake any effective risk assessment.
| CONCLUSION
There is still no satisfactory conclusion regarding the origin of the BSE epidemic. If C-BSE is, such as H-and L-BSE are thought to be, a rare spontaneous disease, then relaxation of the ban on intraspecies recycling of MBM could ultimately result in a repeat of the epidemic.
Research is needed to fill these knowledge gaps; many of these are closely linked to the requirements to develop more effective tools The case numbers of C-BSE have declined rapidly, which is undoubtedly related to the strict controls on ruminant protein and its use in animal feed. Occasional cases still occur (including recently in animals 5-8 years old, both in the EU and North America), many years after the feed bans were put in place. It is unclear whether these can be attributed to poor implementation or policing of the feed bans, or whether they support the hypothesis that, such as the atypical types of disease, C-BSE was originally a rare, potentially spontaneous disease of cattle, in which case occasional cases will continue to occur. In the light of recent experimental findings, it cannot be excluded that atypical BSE might have been the origin of C-BSE. This highlights the fact that the origin of BSE has never been conclusively identified. All of this will have implications once existing bans and levels of surveillance are both relaxed.
All aspects of disease control are expensive. The greatest costs are surveillance, SRM and feed controls. There is current pressure to relax feed controls and, at the same time, pressure from other sources to reduce surveillance. While the cost benefit argument can be applied successfully to either of these approaches, it would be necessary to maintain the ban on intraspecies recycling and some baseline surveillance. However, the potential risk is not limited to intraspecies recycling; recycling with cross-species transmission may be an ideal way to select or/and modify properties of TSE agents in the future.
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